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This paper addresses a usual criticism in the literature of the wel-
fare costs of in‡ation, related to the fact that some items in the rele-
vant de…nition of money pay interests, while others do not. We show
that the problem can be solved by using a Divisia index of monetary
services as the welfare measure.
1 Introduction
This work aims at investigating, in the search for an adequate measure
of the welfare costs of in‡ation, the fact that some assets included in the
theoretically-relevant de…nition of money pay interest, while others do not.
The problem is widespread in the literature. Many analyses de…ne money as
a non-interest-bearing asset held by households but, at the same time, use
M® (® ¸ 1) as the respective empirical counterpart.
Referring to the calculation of the welfare costs of in‡ation, Marty (1999,
p.46) notices that:
“if M1 is used as a relevant money supply, some correction
must be made for the interest paid on portions of M1”.
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1Lucas (2000) also voices concern regarding this fact. Indeed, the connec-
tion between the welfare costs of in‡ationandthe Divisia indices of monetary
services has been conjectured by this author (p. 270):
“I share the widely held opinion that M1 is too narrow an
aggregate for this period [the 1990s], and I think that the Di-
visia approach o¤ers much the best prospects for resolving this
di¢culty”.
However, Lucas (2000) does not develop the link between the theoretical
measures of the welfare costs of in‡ation and the Divisia index of monetary
services. By developing such a link here, we establish a framework that
validates his conjecture.
Our primary purpose in this paper is not empirical. We are solely inter-
ested in providing a theoretical investigation of how one could think about
the welfare costs of in‡ation in a model in which di¤erent monetary aggre-
gates are used for transacting purposes.
Our results build directly on Simonsen and Cysne’s (2001) work, which,
in turn, draws upon Lucas (2000). We extend Simonsen and Cysne’s origi-
nal results by investigating situations in which: i) the opportunity costs of
all monetary assets are allowed to vary; ii) interest rates are endogenously
determined in a general-equilibrium setting and; iii) …nancial innovations are
taken into consideration. As in these previous works, our economy is a deter-
ministic one. Further extensions, including the analysis of risk, are suggested
in the Conclusion.
We present our results in two consecutive steps. In the …rst (Section 6),
we assume that the government (here consolidated with the Central Bank)
issues all the types of money, either interest-bearing or non-interest-bearing,
setting the respective interest rates. Although the objective here is more
of a didactic nature, this part of the analysis can be useful as a proxy for
situations faced by high-in‡ation economies1, or in the case of a banking
system facing legal restrictions.
In a secondstep(Section 7), we close the model by assuming that interest
rates on monetary assets are determined by a competitive banking system.
Instead of …xing the interest rates, the government is then supposed to …x
the reserve requirements on each asset.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. Section 3 is used to de…ne three di¤erent versions of the Divisia
index of monetary services and prove their path independence. Section 4
demonstrates how well the Divisia indices approximate the welfare cost of
in‡ation.
2Section 5 shows that …nancial innovations have a direct negative impact
on the welfare costs of in‡ation. Section 6 exempli…es the use of the di¤erent
welfare measures investigated here in applied work and brie‡y discusses the
case when the assets’ demand functions are not known by the researcher.
Section 7, as previously mentioned, closes the model by introducing a
banking system and allowing interest rates to be competitively determined.
In this section we also establish su¢cient conditions under which the mone-
tary base emerges as the adequate aggregate to be used in the calculations
of the welfare costs of in‡ation2.
Finally, Section 8 o¤ers the conclusions of the work.
2 The Model
² Households and Firms
Consider an economy where n (n ¸ 1) di¤erent assets can be useful for
transacting purposes. We call such assets monetary assets. Households can
also hold bonds issued by the government. Such bonds, which are not help-
ful for transacting purposes, pay the (endogenously determined) benchmark
interest rate °: Each monetary asset is supposed to have, at the margin, a
di¤erent degree of moneyness.
We denotethemonetaryassetsby then¡dimensional vectorX = (X1;X2;:::;Xn);
andtheirreal quantitiesby thevectorx = (x1;x2;:::;xn) = (X1=P;X2=P;:::;Xn=P):
~ ° = (°1;°2;:::;°n) stands for the interest rate vector associated (in the ob-
vious way) with x: We think of x1 as currency, in which case °1 = 0: The
vector of opportunity costs is de…ned by u = (u1;u2;:::;un) = (° ¡ °1;° ¡
°2;:::;° ¡ °n):
Assumption 1: x 2 Rn
++, u 2 Rn
++:





where U(c) is a concave function of the consumption at instant t and g > 0.
The household is endowed with one unit of time that can be used to transact
or to produce the consumption good, so that y + s = 1; where y stands
for the production of the consumption good and s for the fraction of the
initial endowment spent as transacting time. Note that the product (GDP)
is normalized to one when the shopping time is equal to zero.
In their intertemporal utility maximization, households take as a given
the nominal interest rate on bonds, °, and the opportunity costs of holding
3monetary assets, u = (u1;u2;:::;un): Letting P = P(t) be the price of the
consumption good, households face the budget constraint:
n X
i=1
_ Xi + _ B = °B +h~ °;Xi+ P (y ¡ c) + H
where H indicates the (exogenous) ‡ow of income transferred to the house-
hold by the government. Making ¼ = _ P=P (in‡ation rate), °R = (°1 ¡




_ xi = 1¡ (c +s)+ h+ (° ¡ ¼) b+ h°R;xi (1)
The consumer is also subject to the transacting-technology constraint:
c = N(x;s) (2)
Assumption 2: The transacting technology N(x;s) is blockwise-weakly
separable with respect to the vector x and the variable s3:
We assume the particular case of separability:
c = N(x;s) = G(x)Á(s): (3)
with Á(0) = 0; Á
0 (s) > 0 ;Á
0 0(s) 5 0:
Assumption 3: The monetary aggregatorfunction G(x)isdi¤erentiable,
…rst-degree homogeneous, and strictly increasing in each of its variables, with
decreasing marginal returns.
In the steady state, necessary conditions for optimizationare given by the
equilibrium equation (4) and by the …rst order conditions (5) and (6) below:
1¡ s = G(x)Á (s) (4)
° = ¼ + g (5)
Gxi (x)Á (s) = ui G (x) Á
0(s); i = 1;2;:::;n (6)
Equation (5) establishes the link between the rate of in‡ation and the
benchmark interest rate. Given G(x) and Á (s); equations (4) and (6) can
be used to determine the n + 1 variables u(x) and s(x); in which case the
respective Jacobian is a positive de…nite diagonal matrix.
Notice, though, that the function Á (s) is generally not known by the re-
searcher. Therefore, the above equations do not allow a direct determination
of s; the variable in which we are interested. We shall return to this question
in Section 5, where an indirect way of …nding s(x) is devised.
4By using the homogeneity of G and Euler’s theorem, one can write:
Á (s) = hu;xi Á
0(s) (7)
a result that we shall use later.
² Government
As in Lucas (2000), we consider this to be an economy with lump sum
taxation. In the analysis of Section 6, where the government is supposed to
issue all of the monetary assets, and in the steady state:
h = ¡ (° ¡ ¼) b ¡h°R;xi (8)
Note that, except in the case of x1; for which °R1 = ¡¼; the vector of real
interest rates °R above can assume positive or negative values, depending if
the nominal interest rates of the respective monetary asset has been …xed
below or above the rate of in‡ation.
In Section 7 the government is supposedto issue just currency and bonds.
Other monetary assets are issued by a competitive banking system, and their
respective interest rates are endogenously determined. In this case, (8) re-
duces to
h = ¡(° ¡ ¼) b¡ ¼z
where z stands for the real value of the monetary base.
3 Divisia Indices and Path Independence
Divisia indices have been proposed by Barnett (1980) as the adequate way
to build monetary aggregates.
While conventional (simple-sum) monetary aggregates are not useful for
welfare measurements, Divisia aggregates can perform such a function. As
argued by Bruce (1977), there is a general equivalence between Divisia quan-
tity indices and consumer’s surplus measures of welfare losses. A particular
version of this general principleassociates Divisiaindices ofmonetaryservices
with the welfare costs of in‡ation.
Nominal Divisia indices weigh the variations of the quantities of each
monetary aggregate by its relative opportunity costs. In equilibrium, these
opportunity costs are equivalent to prices, and the result is a multidimen-
sional consumer’s surplus measure. In economies where currency and other
monies perform monetary services, components with high opportunity cost,
5which are the ones most frequently used for purposes of transaction (cur-
rency being a superior limiting case), are given a higher weight in the Divisia
methodology. On the other hand, components with low opportunity costs
(those that pay an interest rate close to the benchmark interest rate), which
are theones morelikely to be heldfor savingservices, rather thanfor transac-
tions, are given a reduced weight. In this way, Divisia aggregates adequately
capture the transacting motive for holding money, which, in turn, can be
associated with welfare measures.
Formally, the Divisia index is a map from the set of paths in Rn into the
real line: Di¤erent versions of it can be found in the literature, depending
upon how the nominal prices used in their construction are normalized or
de‡ated (Bruce (1977)). In this work, we work with three di¤erent versions
of such indices (two of which can be used as welfare measures), based on
di¤erent normalization.
We consider continuously di¤erentiable paths Â : [0;1] ! Rn
++ followed
by the vector of monetary aggregates x and de…ne:
De…nition 1: Divisia S (DS).

















This is the original version of the Divisia (1925) index.

















This version of the Divisia index is found in Simonsen and Cysne (2001).
6De…nition 3: Divisia G (DG).







This version of the Divisia index is presented, for instance, in Bruce (1977).
² Path Independence
As line integrals, Divisia indices can su¤er from the serious defect of
depending on the path over which integration is taken. We shall see in this
section that, given the assumptions of our model, all three versions of the
Divisia index here presented are path independent.
The DS version of the Divisia index exactly tracks the associated ag-
gregator G evaluated at the optimum, which implies its path independence.
Indeed, one can easily check that log G(x) is a potential function for the
vector …eld given by FS(u(x)) in (9)4.
Proposition 1 - The Divisia indices DG, DS and DE are path indepen-
dent.







@xi for all i;j;i 6= j: Locally, this is a su¢cient conditionfor path
independenceof DG. Toobtainthe sameresultwithrespectto DE (or DS) it
su¢ces using (7) to substitute ujG(x)=Gxj(x) = uiG(x)=Gxi(x) = Á(s)=Á
0(s)
for hu;xi in (9) and (11), and noticing, again, that the cross derivatives of
the Divisia weights are equal.
4 The Relation Between the Shopping Time
s and the Divisia Index DE
The reason why in‡ation leads to welfare losses in our model is the usual one
foundinshopping-time economies. Households can acquiremonetaryservices
by holding di¤erent types of monetary assets. When in‡ation rates increase,
the opportunity cost of holding monetary assets also increases (either when
interest rates on monetary assets are exogenously or competitively deter-
mined), leading households to spend more time shopping, as a counterpart
7to lower transaction balances. Consequently, the remaining time allocated in
the production of the consumption good decreases, and so does welfare.
In the model presented in Section 2, s denotes the percentage reduction
inproduction and consumption when the economy is not completely satiated
with monetary services, and represents a direct measure of the welfare costs
of interest rate wedges, as a fraction of the product. For empirical purposes,
however, the function Á(s) is not known, and one cannot directly calculate
s:
Following Lucas (2000) and Simonsen and Cysne (2001), we recover s ab-
stracting from the knowledge of the demand functions only. In a subsequent
step, we show that the Divisia index DE is a good approximation for s:
Start by totally di¤erentiating (4) and using the n …rst order conditions
(6) to get:
¡d s = G (x) Á
0 (s) (hu;dxi +d s)
Use (7) and (4) to eliminate Á(s) and Á0(s);
ds = ¡
(1¡ s) hu;dxi
1¡ s + hu;xi
(13)
Equation (13), presented in Simonsen and Cysne (2001), is an n-dimensional
version, for an economy with n types of monies, of the expression that Lucas
(2000. eq. 5.8) derives in his work, in the particular case when n = 1 (with
x1 = M1=P; M1 standing for the usual de…nition of the means of payment).
When n > 1; (13) represents a system of n simultaneous non-separable
and non-linear partial di¤erential equations:
@s(x)
@xi




1¡ s(x) + hu(x);xi
(14)
A solution to this system is a function s(x) that satis…es these equations
identically in x: For n > 1; one should be aware that, if the functions ui(x)
are arbitrarily-assigned, this total di¤erential equation does not necessarily
correspond to a primitive »(s;x) = c: This imposes integrability conditions
on the demand functions that can be empirically tested in order to verify the
reasonableness of our model.
Such integrability conditions originate from the symmetry of the cross


















8As one observes from (15), when V can be made not to depend upon s; as in
~ Vi = ~ Vi(x)








In our case, it follows from (14) that V does depend on s; therefore char-
acterizing a non-separable equation. However, we shall see below that the
additive symmetric of DE (¡DE); obtained from (11), can be used as a rea-
sonable approximation to s: Using DE; instead of s; presents the following
nice features: i) once the demands for the monetary assets are known, assum-
ing they satisfy (16), the attainment of closed-form solutions for the welfare
measures is algebraically simpler (as long as solving a line integral is easier
than solving a system of non-separable partial di¤erential equations); and ii)
alternatively, when the demands for monetary assets are not known by the
researcher, using DE; which is an index, has the advantage of allowing for
direct welfare calculations from market data. In particular, as demonstrated
in Section 6, this allows a welfare-ranking of interest rate vectors.
Our demonstration that DE is a good approximation for s di¤ers from
the equivalent one in Simonsen and Cysne (2001) by explicitly considering n
assets (instead of just two) and, more important, by allowing the opportunity
cost of more than one asset to change.
Proposition 2 - (Generalization of Simonsen and Cysne (2001)): Con-
sider paths Â¤ : t ! x(t); t 2 [0;1];Â¤([0;1]) ½ Rn
++; with hu;dxi < 0 (a
particular case occurs for paths Â¤¤ with limt!0xi = +1 and x0
i(t) < 0;
i = 1;2;:::;n): Let s(x) denote the solution to (13) along such a path. Then,
(1)
1 ¡ e
DE(x) < s(x) < ¡DE(x) (17)
(2) For values of DE su¢ciently low;










Remark 1 - Since DE is path independent, the condition hu;dxi < 0
can be dealt with by considering adequate …nite sequences of paths in Rn
++.
Remark 2 - Since hu;xi > 0; inequality (17) can be immediately ex-
tended to 1 ¡ eDE(x) < s(x) < ¡DE(x) < ¡DG.
95 Financial Innovations
The above development has been made under the assumption that the mon-
etary aggregator is unchanging. Here we consider the case of a non-neutral
technological progress of the …nancial technology and analyze how the mea-
sures of the welfare costs of in‡ation should be adjusted. A non-neutral
progress, for instance, allows us to encompass possible M1-saving innova-
tions in the transacting technology, as seems to have happened in the 80s
and 90s. The analysis can be easily accomplished by assuming a transacting
technology given by
G(~ x) = G(±1x1;±2x2;:::;±nxn)
where ~ xi = ±ixi; i = 1;2;:::;n; with the variables ±i allowed to vary in
order to translate productivity variations. Proceeding the maximization of
utility as before, the …rst order equations remain the same. Besides, since





1¡ s + hu;xi
of which, for paths satisfying
Pn






is a good approximation.
Proposition 3: Inthe caseof non-neutral …nancial innovations, thesame
Divisia weights 1=(1+ hu;xi) de…ned in (10) can be used in the calculations
of the welfare costs of interest-rate wedges or in‡ation. However, a second
term, (xid±i=±i); which depends on the rate of growth of the productivity
of each asset (as well as of the level of each asset), must be added in the
weighed sum5.
Financial innovations, as displayed by (19), have a direct negative e¤ect
on the welfare costs of in‡ation. This point explains why countries under
severe in‡ationary processes usually present a high demand for …nancial in-
novations, mainly those which allow households to economize on currency
and noninterest-bearing demand deposits (where the weights are higher).
106 Measuring Welfare Costs in Empirical Re-
search
As remarked in the Introduction, our purpose in this section and the next
is not quantifying the welfare costs of in‡ation for particular economies.
The simulations only aim to clarify how our theoretical results could be
used in practice. We also remind the reader that we have already derived,
analytically, a maximum relative error of ¡DE; as an approximation to s
(see (18)), which replaces the usual sensitivity analysis.
² Ranking Interest-Rate Wedges
When there is only one interest rate, and therefore only one opportunity
cost to be considered, the Friedman rule, when valid6, states that the social
optimum is achieved by makingthe interest rate (and the opportunity cost of
currency) equal to zero. The same type of rule applies, multidimensionally,
inour model. If all opportunity costs tend toward zero, s tends towards zero.
However, in economies where several opportunity costs are considered, it
is not always clear which situation leads to a higher or lower welfare, since
some costs can increase, while others decrease. In this case, the Divisia
indices presented here can be used as a device for reducing the comparison
between two di¤erent opportunity costs vector (or two di¤erent monetary
assets vector) to a single scalar.
In the example belowwe analyze a case inwhich the vector ofopportunity
costs has changed from u(x(0)) to u(x(1)): We assess the welfare variation
using (13), (11) and (12), as well as the lower bound for s (1 ¡ eDE(x))
presented in (17) .
Example 1 - We consider an economy where Á(s) = s and the transact-
ing technology (which is not known by the researcher) is given by:






1 = a1 +a2+ ::: +an; A > 0
We assume, in addition, that the researcher has been able to properly esti-
mate the demand functions compatible with this technology (the case when




; i = 1;2;:::;n (20)
Our objective is recovering the measure s (or some good approximation of
it) abstracting from the knowledge of these demands, but not of the function
11Á(s): The …rst option is plugging equations (20) directly into (13) and solving







1¡ s + hu;xi





One possible problem with this alternative is that providing a closed-form
solution to the non-separable partial di¤erential equation (13) can be a non-
trivial task, depending on the assets demand functions that are plugged into
(13)7. Alternatively, one can use the approximation DE; given by (11), a









For the purpose of comparison, we also present the expression for DG :




In order to illustrate these results with a numerical example, consider a
situation where n = 3; A = 2000; a1 = 0:5; a2 = 0:3; a3 = 0:2: We assume
the initial values of the monetary aggregates to be given by x1(1) = 0:090;
x2(1) = 0:058; x3(1) = 0:045; and the …nal values by x1(2) = 0:053; x2(2) =
0:032; and x3(2) = 0:022 . The implied values of the opportunity costs in
the …rst and second situations are given by, respectively, u(1) = (4:0156%;
3:7387%; 3:2125%) and u(2) = (12:1857%; 12:1095%, 11:7426%): In this case
we get, as a percentage of the product:
1¡ eDE s ¡DE ¡DG
Initial 0.7202 0.7228 0.7228 0.7254
Final 1.2834 1.2917 1.2918 1.3001
Variation 0.5632 0.5689 0.5689 0.5747
If the researcher chooses to solve the non–separable partial di¤erential equa-
tion, he will …nd a welfare cost …gure, due to the change of the vector of
opportunity costs, from u(1) to u(2), of 0:56886% of GDP. Alternatively,
the use of the Divisia index ¡DE; leads to the …gure of 0:56892% of GDP, a
negligible di¤erence. In any case, as claimed, the Divisia methodology allows
a ranking of the di¤erent interest vectors.
12² The Case of Unknown Demands
In the example above, we assumed the exact functional speci…cation and
the parameters of the assets demand functions to be known by the researcher.
When this is possible, one only needs to rely on quantity data and on the
estimated parameters of the underlying demand functions.
When this is not possible, or is too costly, the results derived here can be
useful by considering the discrete version of (11). Indeed, one nice feature
of using the Divisia index DE as a welfare measure is that it can always
be computed, given observations on interest rates and monetary aggregates.
Statistical index numbers do not depend on any unknown parameters. The
use of market prices compensate for the absence of knowledge about pa-
rameters or functional speci…cations. Prices (here, opportunity costs) and
quantities have the advantage of being directly observable.
Since collecting data in continuous time is impossible, one has to rely on
some approximation of (11) de…ned in discrete time. DED, below, provides
one such possible approximation:


















DED consistently approaches DE as ¢t goes to zero. If we use this formula
to make a rough approximation of DE; based only on the initial and …nal
values of the variables, we get, using the parameter values of our previous
example, ¢DED = ¡0:6728, as against the value ¢DE = ¡0:5689 previ-
ously calculated. The approximation can always be improved by the use of
additional quantity and price data observations between the two periods of
reference.
² Measuring the Welfare Costs of Inflation
It follows from (5) that our economy is a Fisherian one, where the bench-
mark interest rate is determined by the rate of in‡ation, which is endogenous
in the model, and by the rate of time preference. In this case, since we are
assuming so far that the interest rates of the monetary assets are exogenously
determined by the government, the interest-rate wedges are directly linked
13to the in‡ation rate (Section 7 deals with the case when the interest-rate
wedges are endogenously determined in a competitive economy).
Example 2 - We use the same particular transacting technology, the
same demand functions and the same values of the parameters n; A; a1; a2;
anda3 of example 1. We initiate the table below assuming the economy to be
satiated with monetary services for an annual rate of de‡ation equal to 2%:
We then make the annual in‡ation rate (¼) vary from 0:0% to 2:0 (200%).
With the rate of time preference ½ = 0:02 , the nominal interest rate of the
benchmark assetvaries from 0:02to 2:02. Sincecurrency (x1inthis example),
by de…nition, pays a nominal interest rate equal to zero, its opportunity cost
(u1) will also vary in the same range. The two other assets, x2 and x3; are
assumed to pay annual …xed nominal interest rates equal to, respectively,
0:003 (0:3%) and 0:008;(0:8%); in which case their opportunity costs will
vary from 0:017 to 2:017 (x2); and from 0:012 to 2:012 (x3); respectively.
The table below presents the values of the di¤erent measures of the welfare
costs of in‡ation as a percentage of GDP.
Inflation 1 ¡ eDE s ¡DE ¡DG
-2% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0% 0.4883 0.4895 0.4895 0.4907
5% 0.9623 0.9669 0.9669 0.9716
10% 1.2662 1.2742 1.2743 1.2824
20% 1.7151 1.7298 1.7300 1.7449
50% 2.6213 2.6557 2.6563 2.6916
100% 3.6376 3.7038 3.7054 3.7741
150% 4.4073 4.5043 4.5073 4.6089
200% 5.0481 5.1753 5.1800 5.3141
One can observe that the di¤erence between s and ¡DE is immaterial, even
for values of ¡DE not so close to zero.
Besides the convergence of 1 ¡ eDE;s;¡DE and ¡DG to zero, for low
rates of in‡ation, it becomes clear that, as in‡ation rises, both the di¤erence
between s and 1 ¡ exp(DE); and between ¡DG and s, increase. The same
happens to ¡DE ¡ s, but at a signi…cantly lower rate.
7 Closing the Model
In this section we drop the assumption that all near monies are issued by the
government. Instead, we close the model by hypothesizing that the monetary
14assets other thancurrency areissuedbya competitivebankingsystem. Banks
are supposed to buy bonds from the government and to sell monetary assets
to the households. Government issues currency and bonds and collects a
(…xed) fraction of reserve requirements on deposits, over which it pays zero
nominal interests. kxi stands for the reserve requirements on deposits xi:
Banks buy bonds that pay an interest rate ° and, operating competitively,
pay an interest rate on deposits given by °xi = (1¡ kxi)°: The interest rate
wedge of deposit xi is then equal to ui = ° ¡°xi = kxi°:
Bailey (1956, p. 104), analyzed the e¤ect of banks on the social costs
of in‡ation under two distinct polar situations. In the …rst case, described
by him as that when “banks operate rationally”, the only money used for
means of payment is interest-bearing bank deposits. In such a case, only the
monetary base (then equal to the reserve requirements times the volume of
outstanding deposits) would matter for the calculation of the welfare costs
of in‡ation. Bailey also analyzes a second case, in which banks would not
charge theeconomic rateof interest for their loans, and wouldnotpay market
interest for their deposits (which would correspond to what he describes as
the non-rational situation). In this second case, he argues that the welfare
cost of in‡ation is the same for a given rate of in‡ation “regardless of what
fraction of the money supply is currency”.
Parallel to Bailey’s analysis, Proposition 4 below establishes su¢cient
conditions under which the knowledge of the demand function for the mon-
etary base alone provides all the necessary data for the calculation of the
welfare costs of in‡ation.
Given the vector of reserve-requirement ratios ~ k; the interest rate-wedge
vector (or price vector) (u(t = 1) =~ k°1) is always proportional to some …xed
base price vector (u(t = 0) = ~ k°0), leading, therefore, to a particular case of
a composite commodity (Hicksian separability).
We make x1 in (11) stand for currency (m), with an interest rate °1 = 0;
and an opportunity cost ° ¡ °1 = °: For all deposits, the multiplication
of the interest rate wedge uj (j = 2;:::;n) by the in…nitesimal variation of
the respective monetary aggregate (the term ujdxj = kj°dxj in(11)), exactly
equals the benchmark interest rate (°) times the in…nitesimal variation of the
fraction of the asset that is maintained as a monetary liability of the Central
Bank, as reserve requirements (ujdxj = (kj°)dxj = °d(kjx)): Therefore, the
welfare costs of interest rate wedges can be properly measured considering
only the monetary base (z) and the benchmark interest rate °:
Proposition 4 - Consider an economy where, besides currency, issued
by the Central Bank, there are n ¡ 1 (n ¸ 2) monetary assets that can be
used for transacting purposes, each one paying a di¤erent interest rate. Also,
15assume that the interest rates paid by theses monetary assets are competi-
tively determined by a banking system that takes the interest rate on bonds
and the (…xed) reserve-requirements vector as given. Then, the welfare costs







where z stands for the real value of the monetary base and ° for the nominal
interest rate.
Proof. First, notice that the condition hu;dxi < 0 of Proposition 2 is
trivially satis…ed in this case, provided that the demand for the monetary


























Remark 3 - Note two di¤erences between such results and Bailey’s
analysis of the “rational” case. First, the general-equilibrium approach to
the problem leads to an endogenous determination of an integrating factor
(
1
1+°z) which is not present in the partial-equilibrium analysis. Second, in
our framework the monetary base is composed not only of reserves, as in the
polar case analyzed by Bailey, but also of currency.
Remark 4 - The conditions of Proposition 4 are somewhat restrictive,
indicating that the reduction of the general expression of DE given by (11)
to (25) is not necessarily valid as a general statement.
When the conditions established in Proposition 4 are valid, welfare mea-
sures based on M1 can overestimate the welfare cost of in‡ation by a factor
close to the value of the monetary multiplier (around three in the United
States)8. The basic reason is that by using the base, instead of M1; one
implicitly recognizes the fact that banks return part of their income to the
holders of monetary assets, reducing distortions caused by in‡ation. This re-
sult has been illustrated by Bali (2000) and by Marquis (1999), and is likely
to be robust.
168 Conclusions and Further Directions
We have considered economies where interest-bearing and non-interest bear-
ing monetary assets are used for transacting purposes and have concluded
that a speci…c Divisia index emerges as the correct welfare measure for the
welfare costs of in‡ation. We have also shown that …nancial innovations
have a direct negative impact on the welfare costs of in‡ation, and derived
an expression that shows how to take non-neutral …nancial innovations into
consideration in welfare measurements. Finally, we derived su¢cient con-
ditions under which the calculation of the welfare costs of in‡ation using
the Divisia methodology demands only the knowledge of the demand for the
monetary base.
A nice feature of using an index number is that it allows for welfare
comparisons even when the demand functions for the monetary assets are
not known by the researcher. When the demand functions are known, the
path independence of the respective line integral ensures that only the initial
and …nal values of the monetary aggregates vector will su¢ce for welfare
measurements of interest-rate wedges or in‡ation.
One limitation of the investigations developed here is not allowing for
uncertainty. There is now substantial literature on extending Divisia mone-
tary aggregation to the case of risk. Barnett and Serletis (2000, Section 3)
includes reprints of four important papers in the area. Barnett (1995) shows
that the exact tracking property of the Divisia index continues to hold in
this case, provided that the only risk is relative to future prices and interest
rates. This conclusion might suggest that the investigations here developed
are not a¤ected by this literature (at least in the continuous-time approach),
but adirect analysis ofthe model under risk remains to be explored. Another
recent paper in the area is Barnett, Hinich and Piyu Yue (2000).
A second possible extension relates our investigations with the literature
onthenon-payment ofinterestonrequiredreservesandthesizeoftax implied
on banks. Barnett, Hinich and Weber (1986) have investigated this point.
Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 2 )






























(17) follows from the above inequalities by noticing that: (1) the third term





= ¡ln(1¡ s) jx
1n= ¡ln(1¡ s(x)):
(b) The secondpart of Proposition 2 (equation (18)) is obtained by taking
a second-order Taylor approximationtothe exponential function. This makes
¡DE ¡ (1¡ exp(DE)) ￿ DE2=2s: Using L’Hôpital’s Rule in (11) and (13),
oneconcludes that DE=s tends towardonewhen x(or any ofitscomponents)
tends toward in…nity. Therefore, as the components of x increase, DE & 0
and DE2=2s tends towards DE=2:
Aiyagari, S. Rao, R. Anton Braun, and Zvi Eckstein, “Transaction Services,
In‡ation, and Welfare.” Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998),
1274-1301.
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20Notes
1As Calvo and Végh (1996, pp. 1) observe: “In high in‡ation countries, policymakers
often end up paying interests on part of the money supply”.
2The literature takes di¤erent approaches with respect to this issue (e.g. Aiyagari,
Braun and Eckstein (1998) use the monetary base, whereas Lucas (2000) uses M1 and
Cooley and Hansen (1991) use a measure of “the portion of M1 that is held by house-
holds”).
3For an analysis of how multidimensional partial-equilibrium measures of the welfare
costs of in‡ation can fail to be integrable without this hypothesis, see Cysne (2001).
4Divisia (1925, pp. 43, footnote 1), discusses the equivalence between the Divisia index
and a curve integral. The demonstration of the path independence of DS can be found
in Hulten (1973), for the case of a general, weakly-separable, linear-homogenous function.
However, it was only after Barnett’s (1980) derivation of the user-cost price of monetary
services that the result could be extended to monetary aggregation.
5Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) provides extensions of index numbers to tech-
nological change. Spencer (1998), using a static cost-minimization argument, arrives at
an expression similar to (19) regarding the Divisia index DS.
6See Woodford (1990) for a description of some models that lead to this result.
7We have been able to do it without further problems because we actually made the
inverse way of departing from the knowledge of the transacting technology, a procedure
that is not allowed to the researcher.














1 ¡ a¤ ln(1 + A¤°¡a¤
)
depending, respectively, if M1 or the monetary base are used in the welfare calculations
(DE and DE¤ are de…ned in the obvious way). For a ¼ a¤ and low interest rates,
DE=DE¤; has a value close to the value of the money multiplier.
21